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THE NATURE OF SUCCESSION
JAMES T. CONNORt
6pROBABLY the oldest and most important phase of the long battle
for human liberty", observed Lecky writing in 1896, "is the
struggle to maintain individual rights of property and bequest against
the inordinate claims of the ruling power."' If this is true (and history
demonstrates its verity) it is startling to observe that respectable courts
of law in the United States have promulgated a theory of Succession
which, if taken literally, permits the State to exercise complete and arbi-
trary dominion over estates of decedents, even to the extent of their
confiscation. The United States Supreme Court and the vast majority
of state tribunals, on numerous occasions, have enunciated the doctrine
that Succession is a privilege conferred by the State and that the power
of the State with respect to it is unlimited.2 Text-writers3 and other
commentators4 have adopted the principle without question.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the "privilege theory" of
Succession in the light of principle and experience in order to discover,
if possible, its genesis, its significance, and its soundness. It will be
well to understand the meaning of Privilege and Succession as used in
this discussion. For such an understanding it will not be necessary to
indulge in any Hohfeldian analysis.5 The decisions make their meaning
quite clear. Privilege is contrasted with right. If Succession were viewed
as a right it would enjoy (conceivably) certain legal and constitutional
protection per se. Viewed as a privilege, however, it has no such status
and the power of the State over it is unlimited and arbitrary.' This
t Dean, Loyola University, School of Law.
1. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty (1896), reprinted in part in RPio:,AM BA Sis o LEG.%L
INs TITUo.s (1923) 233.
2. For a collection of the cases see 127 Am. St. Rep. 1035 (1909). And -Qe the recent
case State, ex rel. Luslow v. Louisiana Oil & Refining Co., 176 So. 686 (La., 1937).
3. 4 CooLEx, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) 3448.
4. lcmurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, reprinted
in part in RATIONAL BAsIs Or LEGAL IisTInT'o.s (1923) 452, 456.
5. See the discussion of Koucourek, "Privilege" and "Ilimarniy" as used in the Prop-
erty Restatement, (1939) 1 LoUISIA.A L. Rnv. 255.
6. "It is only by virtue of the State that the heir is entitled to receive any of his
ancestor's estate ...and the same authority which confers this privilege may attach to
it the condition (tax) that a portion of the estate so received shall be contributed to the
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follows from the usual significance of privilege when applied to conces-
sions granted by the government.7 Succession is taken to connote the
transmission of title to things from a person at the time of his death
to a survivor or survivors.8 This transmission may have been directed
by means of a testament, or it may have been regulated by statutes in
force at the time of death. While the term as here used is intended
to include both modes of disposition, the distinction just made (between
testate and intestate succession) will be adverted to in other parts of
this paper.
The striking thing about the promulgation of this doctrine (the "privi-
lege theory" of Succession) is that the cases which have considered and
applied it have devoted very little time or attention to the origin of
justification of a principle so fraught with revolutionary possibilities.9
Aside from one or two of the earlier cases, the courts have been content
to adopt the generalization found in previous cases and then proceed
from that point. It is safe to observe that the influence of Blackstone
has been considerable, if not entirely controlling.1" In fact, the early
cases cite him in support of their major premise." Blackstone is author-
ity for the proposition that "all rules of succession to estates are crea-
tures of the civil polity, and juris positivi merely". 2 Furthermore, the
commentator makes an effort to rationalize his conclusion by observing
that
"the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion, else if he
had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life, he would
also have a right to direct their disposal for a million ages after him; which
would be highly absurd and inconvenient". 13
State." In re Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281, 49 Pac. 181 (1897). "An act of the
Legislature abridging, modifying, or denying the right of inhersion by heirs, other than
forced heirs, could not be successfully assailed on the ground that it deprived such heirs
of property (an expectancy) without due process of law. Until such a right, as Is the
case with most rights, devolves upon the beneficiary, the power of the Legislature relative
thereto is practically supreme." Luslow v. Refining Co., 176 So. 686 (1927).
7. See Camden Fire Insurance Ass'n v. Haston, 153 Tenn. 675, 284 S. W. 905 (1926)
(foreign corporation authorized to do business).
8. See Succession, WoRDs AND PHRASES (2d Series) 756; Revised Civil Code of Lou-
isiana (1870), Art. 871.
9. "The unanimity with which it [the "privilege theory"] is stated Is perhaps only
equalled by the paucity of reasoning by which it is supported": Winslow, J., In Nunne-
macher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627 (1906).
10. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, reprinted in part in RATioxAL BASIS or LEOAt.
INSTITuTiONs (1923) 124. At page 126, Pound discusses the influence of Blackstone on
American law in general. See also McMurray, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 455.
11. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625 (1896); State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 30
AtI. 76 (1894); State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674, 30 S. W. 750 (1895).
12. 2 BL. Cois. c. 14.
13. See id., at c. 1.
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This line of reasoning undoubtedly led the author to deny that Succes-
sion was a part of Natural Law, even though he predicated the right of
property in general on Natural Law. 4 Thus we have another example
of the individualistic preconceptions which brooded over the seventeenth
and eighteenth century exponents of Natural Law.'6 There has been
some attempt to determine what influences controlled Blackstone's
philosophy as revealed in the Commentaries. While this is an under-
taking full of difficulty, 6 a distinguished writer and teacher of law has
observed that with respect to testamentary dispositions Blackstone fol-
lowed Pufendorf rather than Grotius.17 Conceding this to be a fact, it
is evident that the same influence did not obtain with respect to intestate
succession since Pufendorf clearly predicated the latter on the Natural
Law.'
8
The cases contribute very little light on the matter since, as was
observed before, they are content with a simple statement of the "privi-
lege theory".' The Maine court, in the case of State v. Hamlinr did
make some attempt to examine the proposition, but satisfied itself with
a restatement of Blackston e's observation that "property ceases at
death". It is interesting to note that the court in the Hamdin case went
14. See id., at c. 14.
15. Pou--,D, LTER PRETATIONS or LEc.,%. HIsror (1923) 1S; LAw A,. Mors (1924)
33.
16. See Miltner, A Phldosophy of Law (1939) 14 NOTRE D.%Im L.,vmw= 147.
17. McluRAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 454, 455.
13. 4 PurrPNDoaR, D. JuR NATuR.%E Er Grn ar-r (Kennett's translation, c. 11). "Ac-
cording to the disposal of the Law of Nature, without any particular empress Act of the
former Lord, the Properties of Things are said to pass in Succession to Intes*ates. For
Property having been at first embued with such Force and Power, as that by virtue of it,
a man was enabled not only to do what he pleased with his Goods during his own life,
but likewise effectually to transfer them upon others after his Death; it did not s2em
probable that if a person was found to have made no settlement of his Goods whiL-t he
lived, he was therefore willing that they should after his Death become as it vere dere-
lict, and lie free to any that would take possession of them. In this Case then, Natural
Reason suggested That men ought to follow the presumed will of the Deceased, or such a
disposal as he might most probably be supposed to have designed. Now in doubtful
matters everyone is supposed to have designed that, which is most agreeable both to his
natural inclination, and to the Engagements of his duty."
It is evident from this quotation from Pufendorf that he considered Succession part and
parcel of the Natural Law and not a creature of the civil polity, as Blac"ztone had de-
dared. Thus Dean McMurray seems to be in error when he asserts: (See Mcurray,
op. cit. supra, note 4, at 455.) "And the distinction made in the first chapter of the
second book of Blackstone between the right of property arising from occupancy, designatcd
as a natural right, and the right of succesfion, defined as a mere creature of the powitive
law, is doubtless borrowed from Pufendorf . . .
19. See note 2, supra.
20. See note 11, supra.
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to the extreme of stating that there is no provision in the state consti-
tution giving control or right to dispose or to inherit, and from this
inferred that the power of the legislature in the premises (taking the
power as confessed) was unlimited and might well be arbitrarily exer-
cised. On its face, this conclusion embodies a unique theory of consti-
tutional interpretation. This recitation points to the conclusion that the
various courts in the United States have been little disposed to explore
the principle and have leaned heavily upon the analysis made by Black-
stone. This fact alone would justify further investigation as is here
proposed.
The significance of the "privilege theory" of Succession is far-reaching.
Followed to its logical conclusion, the first striking effect is that there
is no legal nor constitutional limitation on the power of the legislature
over the estates of decedents." This means that if a particular legis-
lature so elected, it could cause all estates to escheat. Such a revolu-
tionary doctrine must be (or ought to be) startling to American jurists
since under its aegis a socialistic regime could be created in the United
States under constitutional auspices in one generation.22 The next effect
of this doctrine is that no estate in things could be greater than a life
estate if the legislature so decreed. This conclusion is inescapable. If
Succession were denied and title taken in the State at death it follows
that, so far as any individual's interest in his estate is concerned, it could
not be measured by a period longer than his life. Finally, the espousal
of this principle establishes the State as the source and creator of funda-
mental rights, not the regulator anc& protector of them.2
Before entering upon a criticism of the "privilege theory", we must
dispose of certain preliminary matters. First of all, it must be observed
that there has never been a case (at least in the United States) wherein
a court was called upon to consider the extreme application of the "privi-
lege theory", that is to say, consideration of a statute which provided
that at the death of a person his estate would escheat to the State, or
to some individual or group or institution arbitrarily selected. Thus we
may say that the cases heretofore decided have not the binding force of
res adjudicata on the question of whether or not Succession is a privilege.
Furthermore, it is not the contention of this paper that disavowal of
21. In re Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281, 49 Pac. 181 (1897); State v. Alston, 94
Tenn. 674, 30 S. W. 750 (1895).
22. See Albertsworth, Capital Insecurity under the Constitution, (1939) 27 GEoRoE'rOWN
L. J. 261, for an illuminating discussion of the meagre constitutional protection actually
available to Capital in the United States.
23. For a criticism of this principle see de Laveleye, Primitive Property (1878), re-
printed in part in RATioxuA BAsis OF LEAL INsTITuToINs (1923) 175. See also Leo XIII,
Encyclical, Immortale Dei (1885); 15 BROWNSON, WoRKs (1885) 4.
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the "privilege theory" goes the length of denying any and all element
of control and administration of decedent's estates by the State, even
(conceivably) to the extent of entire expropriation in certain cases.2 4
Rather, this criticism is aimed at the theory upon which the courts
proceed in those cases wherein the privilege doctrine is enunciated. It
is readily conceded that no one can claim the absolute power and control
over his estate, whether during his life or after his death, unaffected by
the superior right and power of the State to impose reasonable limita-
tions in the public interest.25 We will attempt to show, however, that
the exercise of such control can be justified on grounds much less arbi-
trary and revolutionary than those upon which the "privilege theory"
stands. We may observe further that, conceding for the nonce the stat-
utory origin of testamentary disposition, -0 such concession in no way
militates against the vigor of our opposition to the "privilege theory".
And for obvious reasons. As will be pointed out later on, when we treat
of historical considerations, freedom of testation is to a certain extent
a restriction upon Succession. Thus, Succession historically was so uni-
versally recgnized (and especially under the common law tradition) that
it required legislative intervention (Statutes of Wills) to unfetter the
ancestor.27 Furthermore, freedom of testation is in essence merely a
matter of administration. The grant of this privilege by the legislature
in no manner goes to the nature of Succession since the only difference
between freedom of testation, restricted testation, and a r6gime of inte-
state succession is that under the first it is presumed that a testator will
provide for his dependents,2 s whereas under the second and third he has
24. Since the raison d'etre of Succession traditionally has been the conceded priority of
the decedent's dependents (as against the State) it follows that if there were no such
legitimate objects of the decedent's bounty but rather "laughing heirs" (see (1935) 20
IowA L. R-v. 203], the State, in the interest of the common good, could justly go to the
limit of causing such estates to escheat, providing that it was done in a fair and impartial
manner. Furthermore, to preserve order and to avoid controversy, the State should ad-
minister estates of decedents, and laws of a regulatory nature enacted pursuant to this
function of the State are unquestionably valid.
25. The cases are full of examples of the legitimate imposition of restraints upon owner-
ship of property. The literature on these cases is likewise prodigious. See Ribble, TI:c Due
Process Clause as a Limitation on Municipal Discretion in Zoning Legislation, (1930) 16
VniGn oA L. R v. 689. For a collection of the writings on this subject see 2 Sr..r Es.%s
oN Co.rsTrr io.-NA LAw (1938) cc. 3-5. See also Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190.
10s N. W. 627 (1906); Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 3S N. E. 512 (1894). Thu
Blackstone's extreme individualism is the result of logical deductions hardly required.
Rightly considered, it was unnecessary for him to suppose that acknowledgement of the
right of post obit disposition demanded that the decedent be left unfettered in this matter
ad infinitu-m.
26. WATsH, HrIToRY or ANGLO-A r-ICAN L.W (2d ed. 1932) 291.
27. 2 TirrANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) 1806 & 1915.
28. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics (1891), reprinted in part in RAnonu, B,%sIS or LE.
ENsTnnoNs (1923) 447.
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no choice to disinherit.2" In no sense does it bring into focus a supposed
dominant power of the State to permit or not to permit Succession.
An exhaustive examination of the authorities reveals no period in
civilized history (with the exception of Russia-an innovation) wherein
the State has denied Succession categorically. The verdict of history is
that Succession has been a universally recognized phenomenon. 0 As a
matter of fact some of the cases8' which have espoused the "privilege
theory" have taken occasion to review the long history of Succession, to
show that levies (or taxes) have been uniformly imposed on estates of
decedents. (We repeat however that the power of the State to impose
a tax in succession matters does not of itself demand the invocation of
the "privilege theory".) From the time that the idea of ownership
crystallized into definite form there has been a recognition of Succession.
2
Even the most ancient systems of law acknowledge certain priorities in
favor of the immediate family of a deceased member. 8 The Law of
the Twelve Tables84 and the enactments of Justinian" recognized and
provided for Succession. As a matter of fact, testation to a limited degree
has been recognized in the Roman Law from a very early period, 0 and
this influence eventually had its effect on the Germanic law87 and the
29. See Vernier and Hurlbut, Descent and Succession under the Community Property
System, (1935) 20 IOWA L. Rav. 232. Even in those jurisdictions which provide the
legitime (the part assured to the heir), there are circumstances which permit disinhersion.
Typical grounds are set out in the Revised Civil Code of Louisiana (1870), Art. 996.
30. NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY (1936) 100. Primitive and Ancient Legal
Institutionm, EvOLUTION OF LAw SEas (1915) 542; Huebner, History of Germanic Private
Law, CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES (1918) 694 et seq.; Sources of Ancient and
Primitive Law, EVOLUTION or LAW SERIES (1915) 106; BucxiAnD, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS
or Ro LAN PRIvATE LAW (1931) 201 et seq.
31. State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674, 30 S. W. 750 (1895); see Magoun v. Bank, 170 U. S.
283, 287 (1897).
32. See note 30, supra. 4 KENT. COMm. 344 (12 ed. 1873).
33. 1 WIGOjORE, PANORAmrA or THE WoRL'S LEGAL, SYsTEMs (1928) 35. Here will be
found an interesting account of the litigation between Nubnofrct and Khay under ancient
Egyptian procedure wherein the latter claimed the right to till the lands of Nishi, her
(grand) father.
34. 1 THE Crl LAW (S. P. Scott's translation, 1932) 67; Tua LAW or mz TWELVE
TABLES, V, 2: "Where a father dies intestate, without leaving any proper heir, his nearest
agnate, or, if there is none, the next of kin among his family shall be his heir." See
Bucxi.ND, loc. cit. supra, note 30. "Our knowledge of the law of succession In intestacy
begins with the XII Tables, and what they say is not easily interpreted. The primary
right of succession of sui heredes is not stated but simply assumed, in the proposition that,
failing sui, the property goes to the nearest agnates, and failing these, to the gentiles."
The Rules of Ulpian are to the same effect. Cf. THE Civir. LAW (S. P. Scott's translation,
1932) 251.
35. 2 THE CIVI LAW, op. cit. supra, note 34, at 87.
36. See 16 id. at 69 et seq.
37. HuEBN.R, op. cit. supra, note 30, at 750.
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English common law3 Obviously, this is not the place to consider at
any length the respective merits of restricted and unrestricted testation.
In English law, the earliest records disclose a recognition of the fact
of Succession in favor of the heirs of the deceased 0 French law not
only recognized the fact of Succession, but traditionally has imposed
restrictions upon the ancestor in favor of certain of his dependents,
thus expressly recognizing their prior and immediate claim to a part
of the ancestor's estate.4 The conclusion to be drawn from this universal
recognition of the fact of Succession is self-evident. It is difficult to
justify this institution as a creature of the State when the phenomenon
was extant and practiced at a time when any notion of statehood was
vague at best. It would seem more consistent to conclude that a practice
so universally accepted and so universally acquiesced in at all times, in
ancient as well as modern systems of law, is something more substantial
than a mere privilege conferred by the State. It is an institution which
springs from the very nature of man and the obligation which flows from
the family relation. Therefore, it should not be supposed that simply
because modern systems of government recognize Succession that they
have given birth to it. To recognize the existence of a phenomenon,
already in esse at the time the recognizing agency comes into being, is
not to create the phenomenon. 4' Herein is an example of a fallacious
and unsound interpretation of our American constitutions. Those who
,contend for the "privilege theory" of Succession needs must conclude
that our constitutions (especially those of the states) create rights rather
than recognize or enforce those already existing.' This interpretation
mars the line of cleavage between the privilege and the right theory of
Succession. Those who contend for the former trace the origin of the
fact of Succession to an act of the state Legislature. If the Legislature
had remained silent, forsooth, there could be no Succession." To state
the proposition is to answer it. A further answer to the proposition will
be found, however, in the descent statutes which have been uniformly
enacted in recognition of the priority of those closely related to ancd
38. 2 PosaocxA1rD MLuxs N, HrsroRY or ENGrmi L.w (1895) 312; see Cals, Thr
Eyplanatory Process in the Field of Inheritance (1935) 20 IOWA L. REv. 266, 279.
39. 2 HoLDswo3TH, HisToRY or EGLisH LA.W (1927) 91.
40. CoDn NAPo L.EoN (1804) Art. 913, 914. A-mos AND WALToz,, IznoDucriO.: o F. m.Cr
LAW (1935) 325.
41. 1 BAxER, Tim FuNLASENAL L.%w (1916) 12.
42. The creative power of the state is denied however, only as to fundamental rights,
that is to say, the nini-um of capacities demandable as the nece-ary .inre qua ron of
respectable human existence. Obviously other prerogatives, such as to incorporate, to vote,
or to engage in a public calling are of such a positive nature that well may they b Eald.
to come into being at the instance of the State, and not otherwise.
43. State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 30 AtL. 76 (1894).
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dependent upon the deceased.," Can these statutes be said to create the
right to succeed? A more convincing interpretation would be to claim
that these statutes recognize a right already in esse-a right which traces
its genesis to the very nature of the family relation.4
The sociological implications of the "privilege theory" present further
weighty objections to its soundness. There is observable in contemporary
writings a tendency to manifest some impatience with such transcendental
nonsense as "property rights" and other magic "solving words" of
traditional jurisprudence. 6 The plea is for a functional approach to
legal problems with a view to seeing how a particular rule or decision
works" without resort to a priori speculation based upon metaphysical
conceptions.48 It is as a concession to those who find impatience in the
statement that Succession is a property right that we propose to demon-
strate the unsoundness of the "privilege theory" by observing it in action.
If it is functionally undesirable and unworkable, it should command
the opposition of the functionalists. Fortunately (or unfortunately), we
do not want for an example in history, and very recent history, wherein
the "privilege theory"-or what amounted to the same thing-was in-
voked. By decree of April 27th, 1918, Russia abolished inheritance.40
Five years later however the civil code ie-introduced inheritance. 0
The reason for the restoration of Succession was the discovery that the
people were circumventing the law so flagrantly that it was considered
more expedient to allow Succession and impose a tax on it than to
attempt confiscation. 51 While this is the only example which relates to
Succession as such, the history of legal institutions supplies numerous
examples of attempts to foist arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions
44. See, for example, ILL. RaV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 49.
45. Pius XI, Encyclical, Quadragesimo Anne (1931).
46. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, (1935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 809, 820. But see Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach,
(1936) 5 FORDHTAi L. R-v. 272 (a reply to Cohen's article), and More Functional Non.
sense, (1937) 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 75.
47. Cohen, op. cit- supra, note 46, at 821 et seq.
48. See FRANK, LAW AND T E MODERM MIND (1935) 243; Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris-
prudence-The Next Step, (1930) 30 COL. L. Rav. 431, 453 and Some Realism about Real-
ism, (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222.
49. Holman, The Law of Succession in Soviet Jurisprudence, A Survey, (1936) 21
IOWA L. REv. 487.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. And see Editorial in the New York Times, Feb. 7, 1939, p. 18, col. 2, en-
titled Motives under Communism quoting this press dispatch from Harold Denny, Moscow
correspondent: "Soviet industrial leaders are finding that people work here from the same
motives that they work in the capitalist system. Some work for pride of accomplishment,
or for the benefit of their fellowmen. Some work to get the highest possible financial
reward. Some work because if they do not they will starve".
[Vol, 8
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upon people, and arbitrarily to impair or deny what were conceived to
be fundamental property rights with no more success than that which
accompanied the Soviet experiment. The practice of Common Recov-
eries in English land law was invented to avoid the Statute de Donis.*2
In a recent interesting article,53 there is discussed an example of re-
strictive legislation and the means employed to evade its provisions.
It should be evident then, even to a Realist, that Succession viewed as
a privilege is unworkable and therefore untenable.
Having paid our respects to the functional approach, perhaps we may
be permitted one or two observations of an a priori nature, while on
the subject of sociological considerations, which point to the same copi-
clusion as the Soviet experience in denying Succession. Any inquiry into
the nature of human society has led to the universal conclusion that it
centers around the family institution. 4 The family as a social entity
antedated the State." An examination of the nature of the family rela-
tion reveals certain basic and self-evident propositions. A primary
obligation imposed by the nature of the institution is that the parents
should look after and provide for the offspring. 0 Reason dictates that
in the first instance this duty should fall to those who brought the
offspring into being. In all ages civilized societies have recognized this
as one of the motivating factors of industry and progress.P7 The obliga-
tion imposed upon parents to provide for the well-being of their off-
spring creates a corresponding right upon the part of the off-spring to
have this care and attention, at least until such time as the child becomes
self-sufficient. This seems self-evident and has all of civilized history and
human experience to support it. It follows from this that the worldly
goods that the parents have acquired should be devoted, in the first
instance, to the care and welfare of the family. Reason dictates that a
parent who squanders his possessions in frivolous pastime, with resulting
privation on the part of his children, is derelict in a primary duty imposed
upon him as a parent. It is apparent in such a situation that a dependent
child ought to be able to assert his claim to support against the parent.
Here, again, every civilized system of law recognizes the reasonableness
of this claim and provides for its enforcement. Having established the
priority of the dependent off-spring with respect to the worldly goods
52. 1 T=iANY, R-AL PROPE:RT (1920) 70.
53. Nabors, The Shortcomnings of the Lotdiana Trust Estates Act, (1939) 13 TLr,%sx
L. REV. 178.
54. WESTERmARcx, TE HSTORY OF Humu MARRITGE (5th ed. 1922) 24. NoXws: op.
cit. supra, note 30, at 36. Here the author discusses famMal.
55. Leo X=I, Encycical, Rerun; Novarun; (1891).




of the parent, based as it is on the primary duty of the parent to support
its off-spring, can it be said that the death of the parent leaving dependent
children destroys this claim? Rather, is it not more reasonable to con-
clude that this claim or right (to support) still obtains in favor of the
surviving dependent child and ought to be enforced against the estate
of the deceased parent?58 And can it, in reason, be argued that the
State is prior to the dependent progeny in its claim to this estate?50
Yet those who contend for the "privilege theory" of Succession must
answer that the State does enjoy a priority if it wishes to assert it.
It is patent then that sociological considerations lead to a repudiation
of the "privilege theory" of Succession.
The political significance of the "privilege theory" commands atten-
tion. Obviously a complete inquiry would entail exhaustive consideration
of the origin and nature of the State, 0 since it is patent that those who
contend for the "privilege theory" of Succession must (if they are logical)
contend likewise for a totalitarian state, i.e., the State is the source of
all authority and of all rights.61 It would follow from this that the State
would be the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong (or is there no differ-
ence?) and that what it decrees is right willy nilly. It may grant or
withhold at its pleasure, limited only, in a few remaining spots on the
globe, by the fundamental law-the constitutions. The evil of such a
political philosophy is too manifest in contemporary life to require in-
dictment here. Nevertheless, the proponents of the "privilege theory"
go the length of contending that even the fundamental law imposes no
restraints upon the State in succession matters. 2 This is Austin's idea.03
Stated another way this political theory of the State announces
"The simple plan
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."4
58. Is not this proposition the very basis of the "forced heirship" and restricted testa-
tion doctrine?
59. 2 KENT Comm. *326: "It [succession] is in accordance with the sympathies and
reason of all mankind, that the children of the owner of the property which he acquired
and improved by his skill and industry, and by their association and labor, should have
a better title to it at his death than the passing stranger. . .. This better title of the chil-
dren has been recognized in every age and nation. . . . " And see Christian's criticism
of Blackstone's conception of Succession (as a creature of the juris ppsitivi). 2 BL. CoM.
(Christian's ed. 1800) 9, n. 2.
60. The literature ranges from ARiSTOTLE, Poracs To I-ihmE, MEWn KaUsPFI
61. SAzmro.ND, JURIsPRUDENcE (8th ed. 1930) 238.
62. State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 30 Atl. 76 (1894) ; In re Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal.
781, 49 Pac. 181 (1897).
63. AusTiN: JUISPRUDENCE, (1874) 233.
64. WoRDswotTH, ROB Roy's GRAVE.
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Before taking up the constitutional aspects of the question, we must
dispose of some preliminary matters. It must be noted that all of the
cases which have had occasion to enunciate the "privilege theory" of
Succession were dealing with matters of taxation. Secondly, there was
no need to invoke such a controversial and untenable theory in order
to justify the same conclusion as that found in the casesYc5 Finally, it
must be remembered that an extreme application of the "privilege
theory", that is to say, a statute denying Succession, has never been
before courts in the United States. The exact reasoning of the typical
case is as follows: ".. .it is only by virtue of the statute that the heir
is entitled to receive any of his ancestor's estate."6G What the State
can deny in toto it can limit in part. Therefore, since this tax is merely
a limitation upon the quantom received, it is clearly within the power
of the State to exact it, the Constitution notwithstanding. T
To justify state control of and taxation of the estate of decedents on
grounds less controversial than the "privilege theory", the following
reasoning might be and has been employed."' From the very nature of
government (whatever theory of its origin may be proposed), it follows
that a tribute can be exacted lawfully from all whom the government
serves and who receive its protection02 No serious argument can be
opposed to this proposition. It is also self-evident that this tribute can
be imposed on all lawful objects and upon the benefits which the govern-
ment secures to its citizens or subjects. One of these benefits is the
65. See opinion of Marshall, J., in Nunnemacher v. State, supra, note 25; Gelsthorpe
v. Furnell, 20 Mont. 299, Si Pac. 267 (1S97). In this case Hunt, J. obServed infer ai.a:
"... protection is guaranteed by the state, not alone to the property of the decedent and
to those who are justly entitled thereto, but also to the right to receive the property, by
affording to those enjoying that right means to determine its extent, and enforce the
same when determined, to the end that it shall accrue absolutely to them, freed from the
control of an administrator or an executor. As a correlative proposition, the state has the
power to demand of those upon whom it confers the right, and to whom it affords this
measure of protection, a tax, to help sustain its protection... P
66. In re Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281, 49 Pac. 181 (1897).
67. The decision in the Wilmerding case proceeds on the theory that, since Succession is
a privilege, taxes levied on estates of decedents are not subject to the same constitutional
inhibitions that attach to the taxing power generally. It is evident that Holmes, J. was of
the same opinion. Dissenting in Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466 (1907), the late justice
stated: "I always have believed that a state inheritance tax vas an exercLe of the power of
regulating the devolution of a property by inheritance or will upon the death of the
owner-a power which belongs to the states; and I have been fortified in my belief by
the utterances of this court from the time of Chief justice Taney to the present day. For
that reason the power is more whi,dted [italics mine] than the power of a state to tax
transfers generally."
68. Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 38 N. E. 812 (1894); Nunnemacher v. State.
129 Wis. 190, 103 N. W. 627 (1906).
69. 2 CooLLT's CoNsrrTMoNAL LInrrAIIOS (8th ed. 1927) 986.
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assurance which a citizen has," and which his dependents should be
able to rely upon, that his estate will be administered in a fair and
orderly manner; that it will not be confiscated or alienated to the detri-
ment of his dependents. This is, in fact, a prime duty of government.
But, in return for it, the government is clearly entitled to claim some
compensation to defray the cost of administration and to finance legiti-
mate governmental functions. Consequently, the imposition of a fee or
tax upon the transmission of estates of decedents is a legitimate exercise
of the taxing power.7 This justification of the imposition of a succession
tax is a far cry from the pseudo-justification found in the privilege
doctrine. And what is more, it avoids the untenable inferences which
flow therefrom.
One more matter deserves mention before examining the constitutional
status of the "privilege theory". Some of the cases, especially the cases
involving federal estate taxes, have been at pains to observe that it was
the transmission of the estate which was the object of taxation and not
the corpus itself. 2 It is important to note that whether it is the corpus,
or the transmission, or the receipt that is the object of the tax, the invo-
cation of the "privilege theory" (in extenso) renders the inquiry im-
material so far as its effect on the estate of the ancestor is concerned. As
was observed heretofore, it is at most a life estate. This point is impor-
tant.
It is submitted that the extreme application of the "privilege theory"
of Succession would constitute a denial of due process of law as guar-
anteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, of the
United States Constitution. It is not necessary to trace herein the pat-
tern which results from putting together the numerous adjudications of
"due process". This torturous undertaking has been the object of num-
erous well-considered writings. 8 It will suffice here to utilize the sum-
maries which have been made and apply them to the problem at hand.
What is "due process" of law is an elusive concept. Professor Cushman
in his splendid article 74 has pointed out that the very indefiniteness and
70. See Bentham, Theory of Legislation (1871), reprinted in part in RATIONAL BASIS r
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1923) 413. And the opinion of Hunt, J. in Gelsthorpe v. Furnell,
20 Mont. 299, 51 Pac. 267 (1897).
71. 1 COOLEY, TAxATIoN 149.
72. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1899). See State v. Ferris, 53 Ohio 314, 41
N. E. 579 (1895), for a clear statement of the distinction between taxing the right to
transmit and the right or privilege of receiving.
73. See the excellent collection of articles in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1938), particularly those found in chapter 1.
74. The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 id., at
60, 61.
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vagueness of the adjudications respecting its meaning and application
have had some wholesome results in that it has prevented "petrification"
in our law. Professor Kales75 likewise has adverted to the danger of too
much precision of definition in that it would tend to crystalize into a rule
of law binding upon succeeding issues. He describes the uncertainty in
terms "the inarticulate major premise". Obviously the inarticulate major
premise would spell out something like this: A statute which infringes
"fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law"76 is unconstitutional in that it is a denial of
due process of law. The difficulty of application is at once apparent, and
the court has been careful to refrain from any a priori statement of
what it conceives to be fundamental principles or from offering a con-
clusive test to determine a violation of them. In proving the minor prem-
ise of the syllogism, i.e. that this statute infringes fundamental prin-
ciples, there has been a different method employed since Brandeis' famous
brief in Muller v. Oregon." The technique is to refrain from any at-
tempt to formulate a legal definition of "due process", and to provide the
court with sufficient factual data to satisfy it that the statute involved
does or does not infringe fundamental principles as a matter of fact.
This requires a balancing of interests.78 Such statutes do not stand or
fall on the issue whether they interfere with private rights or not, but
rather, granting the interference with private right, does the contemplated
or demonstrable benefit flowing from the statute outweight the obvious
interference with private rights! 9 Applied to the instant case, it would
be necessary to consider the relative worth of interfering with the citi-
zen's control over his property, to the extent of reducing it to a life
estate, as against the estimated or provable community benefit which may
be reasonably expected to result. In support of the minor premise, and in
order to show that the restriction of one's legal interest in things to a
life estate is not outweighed by the general welfare, it is necessary only
to summarize the findings of this paper and thus permit the conclusion
that the "privilege theory" of Succession, applied in the extreme, would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
75. "Due Process", The Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act, id., at 51.
76. The quoted part is taken from the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
77. 208 U. S. 412 (1907).
7S. See Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, op. cit. supra,
note 73, at 699, 711.
79. A fact too little recognized in this connection is that in reckoning this community
benefit, the effect on the citizen whose rights are threatened must likewise be kept in view
since he is, after all, a unit in the community. Thus his interests are in a Eense the con-
cern of both sides of the issue.
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traditions of our people (and all civilized people) and our law (and all
systems of law). Having done this, it is reasonable to suppose that the
court would find that a statute, enacted pursuant to the "privilege theory"
of Succession and which reduced one's interest (property rights) to a
life estate de lege, constitutes a denial of due process. And if it would
so find, then Succession is not a privilege, as the vast majority of the
cases contend. Therefore, these courts ought to adopt a more tenable
premise in support of the taxing power of the State in succession mat-
ters. 0
The burden of this paper has been to show that the "privilege theory"
of Succession is historically indefensible, sociologically undesirable, poli-
tically dangerous, and constitutionally untenable. The procedure has
been negative throughout. We have been content to adduce evidence,
the effect of which is to deny the "privilege theory". A merit of this
method is that it should offend no one's sensibilities nor provoke contro-
versial discussion of a theoretical nature. To go further, however, and
illucidate in a positive manner on the nature of Succession, would un-
doubtedly invite opposition of a kind that might cloud the vital and
fundamental issue at stake. The writer rests secure in the theory of a
Higher Law"' with all of its intendment; that certain fundamental rights
and their complements are inherent in man and ought to be recognized by
the State (and are not conferred by it); that man is a social creature or,
as Aristotle has described him, a political animal,82 and, therefore, these
inherent rights must yield on those points wherein their exercise consti-
tutes a demonstrable interference with the general welfare; that Suc-
cession is part and parcel of an adequate conception of property (even
conceived as a function!);83 that Succession is promotive of both the
individual and community well-being;8 4 that its denial would be pro-
ductive of the greatest mischief and chaos in society; that the power
(which is conceded) of the state to regulate and tax Succession can be
brought to rest upon other and more suitable grounds than the "privilege
80. It must be remembered that it is the theory, employed to justify the decisions In
the cases which is in issue here and not the decisions themselves. As has been pointed
out, the decisions can be justified as they stand, but on other grounds.
81. That is to say, the enactments of the positive law do not exhaust the concept
of law, adequately conceived. See AQUIAs, SumrA TItEOLOGICA, Part II, First Part Q.
90, art. 1. " . . . for lekx [law] is derived from ligare [to bind], because it binds one to act.
Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of hu-
man acts. . . . " (Dominican translation).
82. Politics, reprinted in part in HALL, READINGS IT JURISPRUDENCE (1938).
83. See RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTrruTIONS (1923) 315 and 329.
84. "Man must have something that he may call his own, or he will burn and slay".
This quotation from Schiller is found in de Laveleye, Primitive Property (1878), reprinted
in part in RATIoNAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTIrUIONS (1923) 179.
[Vol. 8
1939] THE NATURE OF SUCCESSION 165
theory"; that the "privilege theory" of Succession is inimical to the
genius of American ideals,"5 uncongenial to its legal institutions, and un-
becoming the dignity of ManI
85. See Hadley, The Constituional Position of the Property Owner, 2 Stucrm Essms
o,; Co NsTrruY O. LAW (1938) 1.
